Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
Economic Research Institute Study Papers

Economics and Finance

2005

Optimal Discounting of Benefits From Cleanup at Waste Sites
Kenneth S. Lyon
Utah State University

Frank Caliendo

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri

Recommended Citation
Lyon, Kenneth S. and Caliendo, Frank, "Optimal Discounting of Benefits From Cleanup at Waste Sites"
(2005). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 312.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/312

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Economics and Finance at DigitalCommons@USU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Economic Research
Institute Study Papers by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu.

Economic Research Institute Study Paper
ERI #2005-15

OPTIMAL DISCOUNTING OF BENEFITS FROM CLEANUP AT WASTE
SITES

KENNETH S. LYON
Department of Economics
Utah State University
3530 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-3530
Email: klyon@econ. usu. edu

FRANK CALIENDO
Department of Economics
Colorado State University

December 2005

OPTIMAL DISCOUNTING OF BENEFITS FROM CLEANUP AT WASTE
SITES

KENNETH S. LYON
Department of Economics
Utah State University
3530 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-3530
Email: kly on@econ. usu. edu

FRANK CALIENDO
Department of Economics
Colorado State University

The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the author(s). They are not necessarily
endorsed by the Department of Economics or by Utah State University.
Utah State University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to its
programs and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age,
marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual orientation.
Information on other titles in this series may be obtained from: Department of Economics, Utah
State University, 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322-3530.

Copyright © 2006 by Kenneth Lyon, Frank Caliendo. All rights reserved. Readers may make
verbatim copies of this document for noncommercial purpose by any means, provided that this
copyright notice appears on all such copies.

OPTIMAL DISCOUNTING OF BENEFITS FROM CLEANUP AT WASTE
SITES

Kenneth Lyon
F rank Caliendo

ABSTRACT
This paper uses a general equilibrium optimal growth model to discuss the role of
optimal discounting of future benefits from cleanup at high level toxic waste sites.
Cleanup simultaneously generates two streams of benefits. One of these is directly from
utility and the other is indirectly from the added productivity of workers. We note that
the optimal discount rate is different for these two types of benefits. Along the optimal
path, the former are discounted at the rate of time preference and the latter at the market
rate of interest. We achieve this by identifying four components of the shadow value of
the stock of toxic waste. These are the utility, productivity, cost and abundance effects.
The distinction between discount rates appears to have been overlooked in the
literature, but has significant implications for environmental cost-benefit analysis due to
the growing interest in applying zero time preference to environmental problems (like
waste cleanup) whose consequences extend many generations into the future. A
numerical example is included to illustrate these concepts.
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INTRODUCTION

The conventional thinking on discounting is that if production externalities are absent
and if the future is certain, then all future benefits should be discounted at the market rate
of interest. (See Weitzman 1994 and Weitzman 1998 for a discussion of the discount rate
when production externalities and uncertainty are considered). Weitzman (1999) says "I
don't see fundamental reasons why we should not keep on discounting [at] the rate of
return to capital." Bradford (1999) and Montgomery (1999) support this statement. But
this sentiment is far more widespread, of course, than the few citations given here.
However, this paper demonstrates that discounting at the market rate of interest is not
optimal for certain types of future benefits.
In environmental problems such as whether to cleanup high level toxic waste sites, the
principal concern is the affect of waste on human health. This paper shows that in such
problems conventional cost-benefit analysis (i.e., discounting all benefits at the market
rate of interest) is inappropriate. Improved human health through waste removal
. enhances the productivity of workers and simultaneously increases utility directly since
the quality of life can be expected to increase.
We show that it is suboptimal to discount utility from improved health at the market
rate of interest. Instead, the optimal rate of discount for such benefits is the rate of time
preference. If this rate is zero, then zero discounting of utility from improved health is
optimal in waste removal programs regardless of the productivity of capital in the market
place. This result is important because there is significant interest in applying zero time
preference to environmental problems whose consequences extend many generations into
the future (see Cline 1999, Schelling 1999, Rothenberg 1999, and Toman 1999).
Conversely, productivity gains from improved health are discounted at the market
rate of interest on an optimal growth path. These diverse conclusions stem from the toxic
waste cleanup, neutralization, yielding utility to individuals and simultaneously yielding
improved productivity of workers. These joint benefits show up in the shadow value of
waste cleanup as separate tenns that have different discount rates.
In the following section a general equilibrium optimal control model with waste
disposal and human health is presented and analyzed. The toxic waste can be removed,

cleaned up, in accordance with social cleanup activities. Waste removal generates good
health which we include as an argument in the utility function. This improved health also
increases the productivity of workers which is included in the production function. The
solution time paths for the costate variables for the capital and waste stocks jointly
characterize the role of optimal discounting in waste removal projects. We then present a
numerical example to illustrate the complex relationships that exist within the model. The
fmal section is the summary.

OPTIMAL GROWTH MODEL WITH WASTE DISPOSAL AND HUMAN HEALTH

Consider an aggregate, optimal growth economy. The aggregate nature of the model
is viewed as a strength, for its assumptions are minimal, and exact functional forms are
neither specified nor needed to demonstrate the intended conclusion. And, the economy
is assumed to grow optimally because the goal here is to discuss the extent to which
future benefits are endogenously discounted on an optimal growth path. This model is a
modification of the growth model presented in Lyon (1996, pp. 258-261).
The model economy produces output, income, yet) according to the following strictly
concave production function
.yet)

= J(k(t), h( wet)))

where k( t) is the stock of capital, and h( w(t)) is the level of human health which is a
function of the level of toxic waste at a disposal site, w(t). (A common concern with
waste disposal sites is the potential for contamination of the groundwater and the
subsequent affect on health). The assumption here is that toxic waste affects human
health, which in tum impairs the productivity of the workforce.
Society can spend income on three items: a composite consumption commodity,
capital, and waste cleanup activity. The variable e(t) is consumption, z(t) is aggregate
investment, get) is waste removal, and e(g(t), w(t)) is the cost of the cleanup activity.
This,cost function is convex with Be / Bg > 0 and Be / aw ~ 0 . Thus,
y(t) = J(k(t), h( w(t))) = e(t) + z(t) + e(g(t), w(t))

Capital and toxic waste are the state variables in this control problem. Capital
accumulates according to
2

dk(t)
dt

= z(t) - 8 k(t)

which can be rewritten as
dk(t) = f(k(t),h( w(t))) - e(t) - C{g{t), w{t)) - 8 k(t)
dt

(1)

where 8 is the rate of capital depreciation.
For simplicity the level of waste is reduced only according to cleanup activity (there is
no biological depreciation of the waste of an appreciable amount over the relevant
planning horizon)
dw(t) = _ g(t)
dt

(2)

Imagine a toxic waste site that was once an area for active dumping, but that is now
abandoned. Equations (1) and (2) serve as constraints in the control problem.
Society receives utility from the consumption good and from the level of health
U (e(t), h( wet)))

This function is strictly concave. Consider the following control problem on the interval
[0, 1], where T is given exogenously:
max: V

= JorT e -pt U(e(t),h(w(t)))dt + e- pT B(k(T), weT))

subject to Equations (1) and (2), where B(k(T), weT)) is a bequest function that measures
the value of endowing distant generations with k(1) and w(1). There are also nonnegativity constraints, which in this section we ignore, so as to concentrate on internal
solutions. In the numerical example, however, we include the non-negativity constraints.
The current value Hamiltonian function is
H( e(t),g(t),k(t)' w(t),A(t), 7](t)) = U( e(t),h( w(t)))

+ A(t)(f(k(t),h( w(t))) - e(t) - C{g{t), w{t)) - 8 k(t)) - 7](t)g(t)
where e(t) and get) are the only control variables, k(t) and w(t) are the state variables, and
A(t) and 7](t) are current value costate variables that correspond to k(t) and wet),

respectively. The costate variables or 'shadow values' represent the change in the
solution value of the objective functional resulting from a unit increase in the respective
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state variables at time t, valued at time t. See, e.g., Kamien and Schwartz (1991) or Hoy
et al. (1996) for a discussion of these ideas.
The first order necessary conditions of this control problem are
BV(c* (t), h(w* (t)))
Bc(t)

(3a)

=0

f

-X(t) aC(g '(t ((t )) - r(t) = 0

(3b)

(3c)

..i* (t)

Bg t
d..i*(t)
dt
dr((t)
dt

=

={
P

+0 _ Bf(k*(t),h(W*(t)))}..i*(t)
Bk(t)

*(t)- BV(c*(t),h(w*(t))) Bh(w*(t))
P17
Bh( w(t))
aw(t)

(3d)
_..i*(t)(Bf(k*(t),h(W*(t))) Bh(w*(t)) _ BC(g*(t), w*(t))J
Bh(w(t))
aw(t)
aw(t)

where optimal values are denoted by an asterisk. The boundary conditions - the initial
conditions for the state variables and the transversality conditions for the costate variables
- are omitted; they are required for a complete characterization of the optimum, but they
are not central to the analysis that follows.
It will be assumed that the market rate of interest is given by
ret) == Bf(k* (t), h( w* (t))) _ 0 .
Bk(t)

We use this definition because it is implied by the implicit user cost of capital, which can
be expected to hold for this model. 1 Thus, we can write equation (3c) as
d..i* (t)
dt

(3c')

= (p _ r(t))..i* (t)

Equations (3a) and (3b) can be written as

I

Along the optimal path we have

P

Bf(k* (t), h( w* (t))) _ ( () S:) () dq(t)
- rt +uqt - - 8k(t)
dt

where the right-hand side is the implicit user cost of capital,p is the price of a unit of output (income), and
q is the price of capital. The statement of income and its uses defmes both of these prices to be one,
implying dq(t)/dt = O. Our definition follows from this.
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8U(c*(t),h(w*(t)))
8c(t)

;r(t) =

-r((t)
8C(g * (t), w* (t ))
8g{t)

This condition ensures that at the optimum, the marginal utility of consumption equals
the value of an extra unit of capital as well as the value of one dollar of cleanup
expenditure, measured in units of utility. Since 17 * (t) is the value of a unit of waste,
-17 * (t) is the value of a unit of waste removal. In addition we consider consumption, c,
to be the numeraire, and we have one unit of cleanup costs equal to one unit of
consumption implying that 8C / 8g is measured in units of consumption. Thus, at the
optimum, income is divided between consumption, investment, and waste cleanup
expenditures in a manner consistent with the above equation.
Equation (3c') is a linear first order differential equation and has a particular solution
(see the Appendix A for a derivation of Equation 4)

x (t) =X (0) exp[p t - f~r(s)ds ]

(4)

Since the objective of this paper is to discuss the degree to which future returns to
waste cleanup are discounted, consider Equation (3d) which is a linear differential
equation with constant coefficient and variable term; A particular solution is (see the
Appendix A for a derivation of Equation 5).
* (0) =

17

* (T)e- pT

+

rT 8U(c* (t), h( w* (t))) 8h( w* (t)) e-pt dt

.Jo

17

(5)

+

8h( wet))

8w(t)

rT 2*(t)(8f(k*(t),h(W*(t))) 8h.(w*(t)) _ 8C(g*{t), w*{t))Je-ptdt
.Jo

8h( w(t))

8w(t)

8w{t)

Equation (5) gives the value of an additional unit of waste at time zero, which is
negative. Additionally, the negative of Equation (5) can be interpreted as the value of a
unit of waste removal, which is the interpretation that will be used in what follows .
Equation (5) represents a decomposition of the value ofa unit of waste removal into its
four components.
To see the intended result, insert Equation (4) into Equation (5)

5

*(0)

=

1]

*(T)e - pT +

rT ex

+

(6)

rT 8U( c* (t), h( w* (t))) 8h( w* (t)) e-pt dt

Jo

1]

Jo

[_
p

8h( w(t))

aw(t)

rt r(S)ds] 8J(k*(t),h(w*(t))) 8h(w*(t)) dt

Jo

8h( wet))

-"ex

p[ -1r(s)ds

aw(t)

]ac(g~ft)'(t)Lt

where the innocuous normalization A,* (0) == 1 has been employed. This normalization is
justifiable because utility is an ordinal concept and therefore can be normalized such that
the marginal utility of consumption at time zero is one.
In Equation (6) 1]*(0) can be viewed as the present value of three return streams
and a deferred item caused by an additional unit of waste reduction at time zero. We call
1]* (T)e- pT
the undesirable abundance effect,

+

T 8U(c*(t),h(w*(t))) 8h(w*(t)) -pld

Io

8h( w(t))

aw(t)

e

t

the utility effect,

+

rT ex

Jo

[_
p

rt r(S)ds] 8J(k*(t),h(w*(t))) 8h(w*(t)) dt

Jo

8h( w(t))

aw(t)

the productivity effect, and

_ rT exp[- rt r(S)dS] 8C(g*{t), w* (t)) dt
Jo

Jo

8w{t)

the cost effect.
The undesirable abundance effect is similar to the scarcity effect in the nonrenewable
resource analysis (see Lyon (1999) and Lyon and Lee (2004)), and is the terminal shadow
value of waste discounted to the present. The utility and productivity effects are the
result of an altered path of health caused by this unit of waste reduction
dh(t)

= 8h(w*(t)) dw(t)
aw(t)

where dw(O)

= -1.

This time path of dh(t) simultaneously generates these two streams of

benefits. The utility effect is the direct effect of dh(t) , and the productivity effect is the
indirect effect. It comes indirectly through added productivity of the workers. The cost
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effect exists only if aC{g{t), w{t ))/ aw{t )is nonzero for some t

dw{t)

E

[0, T], and is the result of

causing an altered path of cleanup costs. We posit that it becomes more costly to

cleanup the toxic waste as its stock gets smaller. This could be due to the remaining
waste being more dispersed or fu~her in the ground. We note that the productivity and
cost effects are discounted at the interest rate and the utility effect is discounted at the rate
of time preference.
Part of why this result is of interest relates to the concern of many economists that the
rate of time preference should be zero in long-term environmental problems, of which
toxic waste removal is an important example. In addition, whenever the interest rate and
the rate of time preference are different, discounting the utility effect at the rate of interest
will give biased results. We illustrate this bias in our numerical examples below.
When speaking of time preference, it seems that the majority of economists agree that
individuals have a positive rate of time preference (see Olson and Bailey 1981 for a
convincing argument). Individuals would prefer benefits now as opposed to later. But
when a proposal spans very long periods of time such as the impact of toxic waste sites,
many feel that positive time preference is inappropriate.
Cline (1999) states that in social cost-benefit analysis of very long-term projects the
rate of pure time preference should be zero. Cline (1999) states very strongly that
"individually, [positive time preference] is a recipe for living like a prince in youth but a
pauper in old age. For those who [make] decisions on behalf of society, it is
irresponsible." Schelling (1999) also states emphatically that "there can be no 'time
preference' of the traditional sort [in proj ects that affect the distant future]. Time
preference, often associated with impatience, relates to impatience about one's own
future consumption, [not to the consumption of distant future generations]." Similarly,
Rothenberg (1999) states that there" ... is no place for pure time preference in the usual
sense of impatience: events occurring at different times beyond the lifetime of the present
generation are irrelevant to the actual experiences of this generation." Toman (1999) also
supports this view. The basic idea here is that positive time preference may be an intragenerational phenomenon that perhaps should not be applied to inter-generational
problems like waste disposal cleanup.
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However, Arrow takes the position that zero time preference implies a potentially
unreasonable amount of capital accumulation. The basic point of Arrow's argument is
easily seen at the stationary state of the model in this paper. If d}.,(t) / dt = 0, then zero
time preference also implies that the market rate of interest is zero (see Equation 3c').
That is, ultimately the market rate of interest would converge to zero because extra
capital accumulation would equalize the marginal product of capital and the rate of
depreciation.

NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
INTRODUCTION
In this section we present two optimal numerical time paths to illustrate the
characteristics of the model. The ftrst we call the Scenario E (for exhaustion) because the
optimal cleanup activity completely neutralizes all of the toxic waste, and the second we
call the Scenario N (for non-exhaustion) because cleanup costs become sufftciently high
that optimal cleanup activity becomes zero before all of the waste is neutralized.
We select functional fonns for the utility, production and cost functions, specify
parameter values, and solve for the optimal time paths using the discrete time fonn of the
problem. We use discrete time because the techniques we tried for solving the continuous
time problem were .unsuccessful. We solve this problem point-wise for a time
independent numerical policy function using value function iterations on a grid. We
divide the state space, capital stock and waste stock, into a 1000 point even spaced grid
and a 200 point even spaced grid, respectively. Then numerically solve the Bellman
equation contraction at each of these points. The result of this is a discrete numerical
policy function, [kt+I' Wt+I] = F(k"

w,). This solution technique has the advantage that as

the step size in the grid approaches zero the solution on the grid approaches the true
solution. The details of this procedure can be found in Bertsekas (1987).
THE ALGEBRAIC EQUATIONS
The algebraic utility function
I~

I~

hr.
U(c,h) = Q c --1 + a h --1 wIth r,ac,ah > o.
1-1-C r

r

r

8

The health function

h

(w ) =

aI

-

b I w with a p hi > O.

The production function
f(k,h)= Akah Y with A,a,r > Oanda+r < 1.
The cleanup cost function
2

C(g, w) = a 2g + a 3g - a4 gw with a 2,a3 > 0, a4 ~ O.
2

DISCRETE TIME ANALYSIS
Bellman's Equation:

Subject to: ·
(D2) kt+l = f(kph(wt))-c t -C(gt' wt )+(I-t5)kt
(D3) Wt+1 = w t - gt
(D4)

gt' Wt+1 ~ 0

Substitution of (D2) and (D3) into (D 1) yields:
(DS)

~(k" w = Max~(ct,h(wt))
+e-P~+l (f(kt,h(wt ))- ct - C(gt' wJ+ (1- t5)k" wt e ,g
t )

gJ}

subj ect to (D4).
The Lagrangean function
(D6)

L(ct ,gt'fllt,fl2t;ktwJ = U(cph(wt )) + e-P~+I(f(kt,h(wJ)- ct - ·C(gp wt )+ (1- t5)kt' wt + flItgt + fl2t (wt - gJ
The necessary conditions:

9

gJ

By the envelope theorem we have:

Defme;t=8~(k;,w;)
8k,

and

t

n·=8~(k;,w;)
aw,

'It

Using these, the necessary conditions become:

(D7.1 ')

8U(c;, h(w; ))

(D7.2')

_e -p{

8Ct
1·
AI+I

e

-p 1·

At+l

=0

8C(g;, w;) + 171+1
.} + Jil'• _ Ji2'•-0
8g,

(D7.3')
(D7.4')
And

(DS.l ')

(DS.2')
•=

17,

(DS.3')
(DS.4')

8U(c; ,h(w; »h'(.)
-p{ At+l (8f(k; ,h(W; ))h'(w,.)_ 8C(g;, w; )) + rJ'+1.} + Ji2,•
wt + e
8ht
8h,
aw,
1·

kl+l = f{kph(wJ)- ct - C(gp wt)+ (1- 5)k,
wl+( = wt - gt
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The algebraic necessary conditions are the result of substituting the algebraic equations
into Equations (D7.1 ')-(D8.4').
(DA7.1 ')
(DA7.2')
(DA7.3')
(DA7.4')
And

(DA8.1 ')
-I

+ a h ht7 bl

P
e- At+1 (-

(DA8.2')

'Ilt

(DA8.3')

k'+l - Ak,ah{ + c, +

(DA8.4')

Wt+1 -

-

wt + gt

blyAkta h;-I + a 4 g t ) - e-P'Ilt+1

(a g, + af -a
3

4 gt

2

- ,u2t

= 0

w t ) - (1- g)k, = 0

=0

(DA8.5')
The components of the shadow values are found by back substitution on
Equations (D8.1') and (D8.2'). Defming 13 = e- P , manipulation of(D8.1') yields

~ = f3A;(88k1o* + (1- 5))
o

=13 2 ~(8ft* + (1- 5))(810* + (1- 5))
8kl
8ko
3
ft * + (11o* + (1= 13 ~(8fz* + (18k2
8kl
8ko
fz* + (1- 5))(8ft * + (1= f34A:(8J;* + (18k3
8k2
8kl

5)J(8
5)J(8

=

5)J(8

5)J
5)J(88k1o + (1- 5)J

f3T+I~+lfI(8f;
+ (1- 5)J
8k
j =O

j

Substitution of the defmition of the interest rate, r, ==

8f/ 8k
t

11

5 , yields

*

o

T

...1,0* =

PT+I·
AT +1 n(1 + )
rj

j=O

Also

A~ = pf+IA;+1

n (1 +
f

rj

)

j=O

(D8.1 ")

Back substitution on (D8.2 ') yields

.} +f-l2•1
711* = au(C;,h(w;))h'(·)
WI +e -p{.,. 1(a/(k;,h(W;))h'(WI*)_ ac(g;,w;)J +711+1
ahl
ahl
Owl
/L1+

710• = au~
aho h'*0 +p{ /'11*(alo*
ah0 h'·0 -

ac~
Ow J+711*} +f-l2*
0
0

h'·0 - ac~
J+P711• +f-l20*
710• = au~
aho h'·0 +11~1.(a/O·
/'1 ah
Ow
0
0

=

0• h'· - a~~J+p21.(aft· h'· - aC;J+/32 • + n * + *
au~
ah h'· +/3 au;
ah h'· +11'1.(a/
/'1 ah
Ow
/"2 ah
Ow
712 jJf-l21 f-l20
o

0

1

I

0

0

I

0

I

THE SCENARIOS
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I

In this section we present the numerical results for the two scenarios. These will

present a comparative dynamic analysis of two economies with different costs associated
with cleanup activities. We first present the parameter values that identify the scenarios,
and then we discuss the resulting numerical time paths.
Both scenarios will have the following parameter values

p

= 0.05, r = 2,ac = 7.8,ah = 4.7,a l = 20, b) = 0.2,

A = 2,a = 0.5,r = 0.4, and £5 = 0.1. The

values of ac and a h were originally 5 and 3, respectively, but were scaled to make

Au = 1

as discussed above. Scenario E will also have a 2 = 9,a3 = 10, and a4 = 0. These values
make marginal cleanup costs an increasing function of cleanup activity, but independent
of stock of waste; hence, cleanup activity will continue until all of the waste is
neutralized. Scenario N will have a 2 = 20, a 3 = 10, and a4 = 6 which make marginal
cleanup costs an increasing function of cleanup activity and very responsive to waste
stock size. As the remaining stock of waste decreases marginal cleanup costs increase at
each level of cleanup activity. As a result of these increasing marginal costs the cleanup
activity ceases before all of the waste is neutralized. These parameter values were
selected to illustrate among other things the effect of the cost function parameters on the
time path of the shadow value of toxic waste.
The model is of course a modification of a simple growth model; hence, in the
implementation of the model we have the economies experience growth of capital,

13

income and consumption. Capital accumulation for both scenarios is depicted in Figure 1.
Capital Stock Over Time
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Figure 1 Capital Stock for Both Scenarios

At the level of resolution of the graph the initial growth of capital stock is nearly the
same in the two scenarios; however, after the first few years Scenario N has the faster
capital accumulation until about t = 20 . Also capital stock is clearly higher in the
stationary state for Scenario E. During the early years Scenario E is channeling more of
its income into cleanup activities and less into net investment than does Scenario N. In
the stationary state Scenario E has higher income because it has both higher capital and
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health (lower toxic waste). These similar relationships are viewed in Figure 2
Consumption Over Time
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Figure 2 Consumption for Both Scenarios

where we observe that in Scenario N consumption is initially higher, but in the stationary
state is lower than in Scenario E. We know from Equation (3a) that consumption and the
shadow value of capital, At' are functionally and inversely related. This is shown In
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Figure 3.
Shadow Value of Capital and Interest Rate Over Time
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Figure 3 Shadow Values of Capital and the Interest Rate for Both Scenarios

The interest rate for both scenarios is also plotted, and at this resolution is the same for
the two scenarios. During the growth portion of the time horizon the interest rate is
falling and in the stationary state is equal to the rate of time preference.
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Figure 4 shows the time path of cleanup activity.
Clean Up Activity Over Time
Scanerio E
- - - Scenario N

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Time

Figure 4 Cleanup Activity for Both Scenarios

Cleanup activity is for the frrst few years higher in Scenario N, because its cost function
yields a very low marginal cost of clean up when the stock of waste is large. This
relationship soon reverses and cleanup activity in Scenario E rapidly moves the toxic
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waste stock to zero. Figure 5 shows the time paths for the stock of toxic waste,
Stock of Toxic Waste Over Time
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Figure 5 Toxic Waste for Both Scenarios

and as already stated, for Scenario E the stock of waste goes to zero rapidly. For Scenario
N the marginal cost of cleanup activity increases to a high enough level to stop cleanup
activity before all of the waste is cleaned up.
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Associated with these time paths are the time paths for the shadow value of waste,
which is shown in Figure 6.
Shadow Value of Waste Over Time
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Figure 6 Shadow Value of Waste for Both Scenarios

The absolute value of this shadow value is the marginal value of a unit of cleanup
activity, and for Scenario E this absolute value starts high when the stock of waste is
high. It then gradually decreases until it reaches its stationary state value. This is as
anticipated; however, for Scenario N the time path of the absolute value of 17/ starts low
and rapidly increases till it reaches its stationary state value. This path is less intuitive,
but just as consistent with the model. The reason for this reversal is that the cost effect
dominates the shape of the time path for Scenario N, but is absent in Scenario E.
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These differences can be seen in Figure 7, which shows the decomposition of
1]/ for

Scenario N.
Components of the Shadow Value of Waste
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Figure 7 Components of 1]/ for Scenario N

We graph only 99 years, time periods, since that is enough to illustrate the relationships.
The line labeled 'Sum' is sum of the four effects, and it coincides very closely with the
time path for 1]/. This is reassuring since the opposite would indicate an error. Note that
the utility and productivity effects are negative, as expected, and that they gradually go to
zero. The cost effect is positive as expected, and is a measure of the impact of the
marginal unit upon future cleanup costs. Suppose we were to cleanup an additional unit
of waste at time t. This will affect the marginal unit all along the optimal path, starting at
time t. In doing so it affects the cleanup costs all along the path from time t on. The cost
effect is the present value of these additional costs, as of time t.
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Figure 8 illustrates for Scenario N the bias that results from discounting the utility
effect using the interest rate instead of the rate of time preference.
utility, Biased utility and Productivity Effects
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Figure 8 Biased Utility Effect for Scenario E

The result is that the utility effect is under estimated, since the interest rate is high and
decreasing during the growth portion of the time horizon. Of course, the two coincide
during the stationary state since the interest rate and the rate of time preference are equal
during this part of the time horizon.
SUMMARY
We have discussed optimal discounting of the benefits of the cleanup of toxic
waste sites. Some have suggested that these benefits be discounted at a zero rate of time
preference and others have suggested discounting at the market rate of interest. We have
shown that it is optimal to discount the benefits that accrue to individuals in the form of
increased utility at the rate of time preference, whether it is zero or positive, and that it is
optimal to discount the benefits that accrue through the added productivity of workers at
the rate of interest.
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To achieve this we identified components of the shadow value of toxic waste
cleanup, -171 • These are the utility, productivity, cost and abundance effects. The utility
effect is the present value of the stream of marginal utilities initiated by the removal of
one unit of waste. This stream is discounted at the rate of time preference. The
productivity effect is the present value of the stream of value-of-the-marginalproductivities initiated by this removal, and is discounted at the rate of interest. The cost
effect is a measure of the impact of the marginal unit upon future cleanup costs, and is
discounted at the rate of interest. The abundance effect is the present value of the terminal
value of the shadow value, -17T' discounted at the rate of time preference.
The relationships within this model were illustrated in two scenarios using a
numerical discrete time implementation of the model. The cleanup cost function
parameters were the only difference between the two scenarios. Scenario E' s parameters
resulted in complete cleanup of the toxic waste, while Scenario N's caused cleanup
activities to cease before all of the waste was removed. These differences yielded
strikingly different optimal time paths for the shadow value of toxic waste and its
components.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF EQUATION 4
Equation (3c') is a linear first order differential equation and has a particular solution
(AI)

x (t) = C exp[p t -

f r(t)dt ]

where C is an arbitrary constant. To obtain a particular solution, letR(t) == fr(t)dt; thus,
A* (t) =C exp[pt - R(t)]

and note that
A* (0)

= C exp[- R(O)]

or
A* (O)exp[R(O)] =C

Insert this value of C into Equation (AI) and use the defmite integral to obtain

X(t) =X(o)exp[pt -
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f~r(s)ds ]

DERIVATION OF EQUATION (5)
The general solution to Equation (3d) is (see, e.g., Simon and Blume 1994)

(A2)
*(t) = {D-

rr 8U(c*(t) ,h(w*(t))) 8h(w*(t))

JL

1]

8h( w(t))

aw(t)

+ 2*(t)(8f (k * (t),h(w* (t))) 8h(w* (t))
8h( w(t))

aw(t)

8e(g * (t), w * (t ))J]exp [- p t ]dt}expfp t]
aw(t)

where D is an arbitrary constant. To obtain a particular solution, let
8U(c*(t),h(w*(t))) 8h(w*(t))
F (t) ==

w(t))
8w(t)
f + 2*(t)(8h(8f(k*
(
)
(t), h( w* (t))) 8h( w* (t)) _ 8e g (t), w· (t) )

[

]

exp - p t dt

*

aw(t)

8h( wet))

aw{t)

Equation (A2) can be rewritten as
1]*(t) = {D-F(t)}exp[pt]

which implies
1]* (t) exp[- p t] + F(t)

=D

or evaluated at time T
1]* (T) exp[- p T] + F(T) = D

Thus,

Use the definition of F(t) and the definite integral to obtain
*(t) = *(T)ex [- (T -t)]+ rT [8U(C*(S),h(W*(S))) 8h(w*(s))
1]
p P
Jl
8h(w(s))
awes)

1]

+2*(S)(8f (k*(S),h(W*(S))) 8h(w*(s))
8h(w(s))
awes)

Evaluate at time zero
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8e(g*(s), w*(s))J]ex p [- p(s-t)]ds
aw(s)

1( (0) = 1( (T)exp[ -p T]
T

+

au(c* (t),h( w* (t))) ah( w* (t))
ah( w(t))
aw(t)

1 +X(t)(af(k*(t),h(W*(t))) ah(w*(t))
ah( w(t))

aw(t)

aC(g * (t), w* (t

))J

exp[ -pt]dt

aw{t)
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